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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law practice of Louis Brandeis serves as an appropriate transition 
between this conference’s look at the history of the legal profession in the 
United States and its look at lawyers as philanthropists.  Brandeis was one of 
America’s most successful and innovative lawyers at the turn of the 
twentieth century and serves as a role model for lawyers in his dedication to 
public service.1 
 *  Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law and Director of the Herbert and Elinor Nootbaar 
Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, Pepperdine University School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Brett Stroud and Ashley Cook for their research assistance.  I would also like to thank Dean Deanell 
Tacha of the Pepperdine University School of Law for organizing this symposium and for her 
suggestion that the legal profession refer to what is commonly called “the adversary system” as “the 
advocacy system.”  In my view, “advocacy” better captures the role that lawyers play and should 
play in our legal system.  This article is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 20, 2012 The Lawyer 
of the Future symposium, exploring the role of the lawyer in American society—past, present, and 
future.   
 1.  See generally 2 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1970–1972 (David W. Levy & Melvin I. 
Urofsky eds., 1st ed. 1975) (detailing Brandeis’s career of public service and work as an innovative 
lawyer).   
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Brandeis, of course, is best known for his work as a Justice on the 
United States Supreme Court.2  He wrote ground-breaking opinions in 
support of free speech and press, privacy, and judicial restraint.3  Franklin 
Roosevelt, who appointed Brandeis to the Supreme Court, saw him as a 
prophet, calling him “Isaiah,” despite the fact that Brandeis played a key role 
in killing Roosevelt’s Court-packing proposal.4  Justice Harlan Fiske Stone 
praised Brandeis for his “social conscience and vision, infinite patience, an 
extraordinary capacity for sustained intellectual effort, and serene 
confidence that truth revealed will ultimately prevail.”5 
Brandeis is less well known for his work as a lawyer, though he 
practiced law for forty years before he was appointed to the Supreme Court 
and his professional accomplishments were many.6  Alan Dershowitz places 
Brandeis on his lists of both the United States’ most influential Supreme 
Court Justices and its most influential lawyers.7  In this essay, after a brief 
description of Brandeis’s legal career,8 I will present Brandeis’s defense of 
lawyer advocacy from his MIT lectures and some qualifications to it that are 
suggested by his later speeches and law practice.9 
I begin with a brief summary of Brandeis’s law practice.  After entering 
Harvard Law School with only a high school education, Brandeis earned the 
highest grades ever recorded.10  Following a short period of law practice in 
St. Louis, Brandeis served as the law clerk to Chief Justice Horace Gray of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court (later a justice on the United States 
Supreme Court).11  Gray identified Brandeis as “the most ingenious and 
most original lawyer I ever met.”12  While clerking, Brandeis and his 
classmate Samuel Warren founded what became one of the United States’ 
 2.  Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 
122 (1995). 
 3.  See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: Teacher, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 733 (2006) 
(discussing Brandeis’s ground-breaking opinions). 
 4.  LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA’S TRULY 
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 2 (1983). 
 5.   Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Proceedings of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United 
States and Meeting of the Court in Memory of Associate Justice Louis D. Brandeis (Dec. 21, 1942), 
in STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LOUIS 
DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 233 (1994). 
 6.  See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 353 (1st ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
BRANDEIS: A LIFE]. 
 7.  Alan M. Dershowitz, The Practice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at BR13. 
 8.  See infra notes 10–22 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 10.  See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 33, 47 (Viking Press 1946). 
 11.  BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 464. 
 12.  MASON, supra note 10, at 61. 
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most successful law firms.13  Fifteen years into his practice, Brandeis earned 
more than $50,000 a year—over $1 million a year in current dollars.14 
Brandeis was successful, both as a litigator and as a business lawyer.  As 
a litigator, he had a reputation as “a tireless, some said a ferocious 
adversary.”15  He enjoyed trials.16  In a letter to his brother Alfred, Brandeis 
said, “I really long for the excitement of the contest—that is one covering 
days or weeks.  There is a certain joy in the draining exhaustion and 
backache of a long trial, which shorter skirmishes cannot afford.”17 
Brandeis also advised small and medium-sized businesses.18  The 
following vignette from Melvin Urofsky’s biography of Brandeis gives a 
sense of Brandeis’s reputation as a business lawyer: 
Marsden Perry, a businessman in Providence, sent his lawyer, 
Arthur Lisle, to Boston to find the best lawyer in that city to handle 
a complicated matter for him.  Lisle first went to see a man he knew 
at the General Electric Company, who promised to find out; the 
man contacted Lisle a few hours later and told him that the lawyer 
he wanted was Louis Brandeis.  In the meantime, Lisle had gone 
over to the Westinghouse Company and talked with its chief 
counsel, who promptly advised him to see Brandeis.  Being a 
thorough man, Lisle also visited two banks where his employer did 
business, and in each of them received the identical response—the 
best lawyer in Boston was Louis Brandeis.19 
Perry employed Brandeis in a complicated securities matter and Brandeis 
devised a creative solution.20 
In addition to his successful private law practice, Brandeis served the 
public interest in several ways.  He and his law partner wrote the article on 
the then-novel tort of invasion of privacy, an article William Prosser 
identified as possibly the most influential law review article ever written.21  
 13.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 46. 
 14.  Id. at 73. 
 15.  Id. at 71. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. (quoting Letter from Louis Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis (March 21, 1887)). 
 18.  BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 60, 71. 
 19.  Id. at 51. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890);  
see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (exploring the broad impact 
of Warren and Brandeis’s article). 
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In addition, Brandeis represented the public interest on a pro bono basis in 
many cases, taught a course on law at MIT, proposed thoughtful law reform, 
and encouraged wealthy and powerful clients to consider the interests of all 
who were affected by what they did with their wealth and power.22  These 
activities will be discussed more fully later. 
II.  BRANDEIS ON LAWYERS AND THE ADVOCACY SYSTEM 
Brandeis practiced law at a time of transition in the legal profession.  
The profession was moving from the nineteenth-century gentleman’s ethics, 
epitomized by the founder of American legal ethics, David Hoffman, to the 
adversarial ethics of the twentieth-century American Bar Association 
(ABA).23  Of the client who wanted him to invoke the Statute of Limitations 
to defeat an otherwise valid contract claim, Hoffman said in 1836, “he shall 
never make me a partner in his knavery.”24  Hoffman argued that lawyers 
should not advocate a legal position unless they believed that it was good for 
“the jurisprudence of the country.”25 
In contrast, the ABA’s first statement of legal ethics, the 1908 Canons of 
Professional Ethics, required lawyers to assert the legal claims of the client, 
irrespective of the interests of justice or the country: “In the judicial forum 
the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that 
is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert 
every such remedy or defense.”26  Lawyers were to play their part in the 
advocacy system.  As we shall see, Brandeis had a foot in each century, but 
here, as in many other areas, he moved against the tide.27 
In the early 1890s, when Brandeis had been practicing law for fifteen 
years, he taught a course on law to undergraduates at MIT.28  It covered 
almost every area of law.29  In a lecture on lawyers, Brandeis defended the 
lawyer’s advocacy role.30  It is likely that he had a tough audience.31 
 22.  See infra Parts II–III. 
 23.  See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION 
TOPICS 64 (1985) (illustrating the legal profession’s transition from gentleman’s ethics to adversarial 
ethics). 
 24.  David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in 2 A COURSE OF LEGAL 
STUDY (2d ed. 1836), reprinted in SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 64. 
 25.  SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 755. 
 26.  CANONS OF ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). 
 27.  See infra notes 28–41 and accompanying text. 
 28.  BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 93–97.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS’S MIT LECTURES ON LAW (1893–94) (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed. 
2011) [HEREINAFTER MIT LECTURES]. 
 31.  Even in Brandeis's day, the reputation of the profession was bad enough to occasion pieces 
in law journals, defending it against its various despisers.  See, e.g., E.C. Bumpus, The Legal 
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At the beginning of the lecture, Brandeis identifies the lawyer as “an 
important part of the legal machinery.”32  This placed his lecture on lawyers 
within the context of the course, but also established a key premise for his 
consideration of the work of the lawyer.33  The lawyer’s advocacy should 
not be judged independently, but should be judged based on its place within 
the legal system.  It is an instrumental role. 
Early in his lecture, Brandeis lays out the criticism of lawyers made in 
Thomas More’s Utopia: 
Sir Thomas More makes the absence of advocates one of the 
characteristic features of his Utopia.  [“]They have no lawyers 
among them, for they consider them as a sort of people whose 
profession it is to disguise matters as well as to wrest law and 
therefore they think it is much better that every man should plead 
his own cause and trust it to the judge . . . .  By this means they both 
cut off many delays, and find out the truth more certainly, for after 
the parties have laid open the merits of their cause without those 
artifices which lawyers are apt to suggest, the judge examines the 
whole matter, and supports the simplest of such well meaning 
persons, whom otherwise crafty men would be sure to run down, 
and thus they avoid those evils which appear most remarkably in all 
those negotiations which labor under a vast load of law.[”]34 
For many years, the English criminal system was somewhat like More’s 
Utopia.35  Brandeis notes that until 1836, criminal defendants were not 
allowed to have a lawyer speak for them concerning questions of fact, and 
they could only call upon a lawyer to argue questions of law if they 
themselves first raised the questions of law.36  Brandeis presents substantial 
evidence that this system did not work—defendants were unable to speak 
effectively for themselves and judges failed to look out for their interests.37 
Brandeis argues that lawyers’ presentation of opposing opinions assists 
the judge in ascertaining the truth: “[G]iven all the evidence at hand in a 
case involved in doubt, a statement of the different arguments in the most 
Profession Defended, 152 N. AM. REV. 504 (1891); Asa Igleheart, Is the Bar Unpopular?, 26 AM. L. 
REG. 681 (1878). 
 32.  See MIT LECTURES, supra note 30, at 238. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 239 (quoting SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 89 (David Price ed., Cassell & Co. 1901)). 
 35.  MIT LECTURES, supra note 30, at 243. 
 36.  Id. at 243–45. 
 37.  Id. at 244. 
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effective way is essential to any certainty in arriving at the truth.  It is the 
clash of the opposing elements that brings forth this spark.”38  Brandeis then 
addresses the view of lawyers often held by laymen—including, no doubt, 
many of the future engineers and businesspeople in his MIT class: 
It is almost the general opinion, at least on the part of those who 
have not occasion to employ the service of counsel frequently, that 
there is something necessarily dishonest in the advocacy of a case, 
either on the one side or on the other.  It is assumed that one must 
be right; that only one can be right; that counsel must know when 
their client is not in the right; and that to advocate his cause must be 
to a greater or less extent immoral.  This notion is singularly 
erroneous; there are, undoubtedly, a number of cases, but the 
number is comparatively small, where lawyers do advocate causes 
improperly; that is, where a wrong is obviously done by their 
advocacy.  In most instances, however, it is quite otherwise.39 
Brandeis identifies common situations where legal representation is 
perfectly appropriate, indeed necessary to a just society: 
 In the first place, questions instead of being simple, so that it is 
clear who is in the right, are extremely complicated; it is often 
impossible to tell who is either legally or morally right, until the 
case is tried out in court, and the decision rendered by the proper 
tribunal.  The means do not exist of determining all the facts until 
brought out by the cooperation of both parties, and the compulsory 
process of the court, and where questions of law are involved, it is 
often only the decision of the court which can determine the point at 
issue. 
 In the second place, in a large number of cases, both parties are 
right, or neither party is in the wrong.  Take for instance the case of 
a person who is injured by some accident in the construction of a 
building.  The person injured has used all possible care, and the 
builder himself has used all care; he has proper appliances, and has 
used reasonable care in selecting them, but some one in his employ 
has done, or omitted to do an act which it is claimed is negligent, 
and for which it is claimed his employer is liable.  Neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant is wrong in any moral sense, and if there 
is wrong legally it is the defendant’s misfortune, and whether the 
 38.  Id. at 243. 
 39.  Id. at 247. 
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defendant is wrong legally can rarely be told before all the facts are 
developed by the trial. 
 In the third place there are cases where one party has a legal 
right, and the other the moral, and there can be no impropriety in 
insisting on behalf of any one [sic] legal rights.  The lawyer has no 
right to set himself up as superior to the law, except in flagrant 
cases.40  Consequently the one party may well insist that his legal 
rights be observed.  On the other hand if the other party has the 
moral right, he and his counsel can with all propriety endeavour to 
defeat the legal claim.  Of course, all of this assuming that the 
lawyer uses fair means and in the conduct of his case conducts 
himself honorably.  It will be found in practice that a large 
proportion of cases arising fall under one or the other of these 
heads, and that it happens with comparative infrequency, that any 
lawyer is obliged to consider the propriety of making a defense.41 
III.  BRANDEIS’S QUALIFICATIONS TO THE ADVOCACY SYSTEM 
Brandeis’s law practice, especially his practice following the MIT 
lectures, suggests three important qualifications to his arguments for the 
advocacy system.  The remainder of this essay will consider each of those 
qualifications. 
A.  Ensuring That All Sides are Represented: “The People’s Lawyer” 
If there is to be, in Brandeis’s terms from the MIT lectures, “a statement 
of the different arguments in the most effective way,” there must be 
someone who makes each of those arguments.42  If lawyers are to ensure that 
the advocacy system yields justice, they must see that all sides are 
represented so that all legal and factual arguments will be heard.43 
Brandeis volunteered much of his time as a lawyer for groups that were 
unable to afford representation, earning the title, “The People’s Lawyer.”44  
His work included testifying before legislative committees, giving speeches 
 40.  It seems that Brandeis eventually concluded that a lawyer generally should not assert a legal 
right that ran counter to a moral right.  See infra text accompanying notes 68–73. 
 41.  MIT LECTURES, supra note 30, at 247–48. 
 42.  Id. at 243. 
 43.  See generally id. at 246–47. 
 44.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 89, 95. 
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to public interest organizations, trying cases, and writing briefs on behalf of 
the public interest.45  In the early 1890s, at the time that he taught the MIT 
course, he led the fights against the Boston rag trade monopoly46 and the 
Boston Common railroad monopoly,47 and represented philanthropist Alice 
N. Lincoln in hearings examining the Long Island pauper institution.48  
Brandeis went on to advocate many social programs that we take for granted 
today: anti-trust legislation,49 industrial safety laws,50 wage and hour 
regulation,51 workers’ compensation,52 public health,53 public 
transportation,54 conservation,55 utility rate adjustments,56 life insurance 
regulation,57 and urban planning.58  He famously argued and won Muller v. 
Oregon in the United States Supreme Court, upholding legislation limiting 
women’s working hours.59  In that case, he submitted the first “Brandeis 
brief”—two pages of legal arguments and 100 pages of economic and 
sociological data—generating an acknowledgement from the Court of the 
value of his contribution.60  When Brandeis was confirmed as an associate 
justice on the Supreme Court, a Boston public interest lawyer wrote to 
Brandeis that he was more sorry than glad: “As long as you were in private 
life, it seemed to me that, if any monstrous injustice should be attempted 
upon helpless people, they would not lack protection.”61 
Brandeis generally refused payment for his public interest cases.  
Earnings from his corporate practice financed them.  Moreover, not wanting 
to be a burden to his law partners, he paid his firm “for the privilege of using 
his time for public service.”62  He paid his firm $25,000 for the work he did 
 45.  See id. at 175, 209, 213, 216–17. 
 46.  See PAPER, supra note 4, at 38–39, 55; BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 86, 94. 
 47.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 131–34. 
 48.  See id. at 89–91. 
 49.  Id. at 317. 
 50.  Id. at 217. 
 51.  Id. at 95. 
 52.   Id. at 481–82. 
 53.  Id. at 483. 
 54.  Id. at 275. 
 55.  Id. at 331.  
 56.  Id. at 611–14. 
 57.  Id. at 175. 
 58.  Id. at 142, 331.  
 59.  See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 60.  See id. at 419–21 (“In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis for the defendant in error is a 
very copious collection of all these matters [non-judicial sources], an epitome of which is found in 
the margin.”). 
 61.  PAPER, supra note 4, at 242 (quoting Letter from Amos Pinchot to Louis Brandeis (June 6, 
1916), reprinted in 4 THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 239–40 (Melvin Urofsky and David 
Levy eds., State Univ. of N.Y. Press 1971–78)). 
 62.  PAPER, supra note 4, at 73. 
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in one public interest case.63  When asked about his sacrifice, Brandeis 
explained that his actions were based on his love for the work: 
Some men buy diamonds and rare works of art; others delight in 
automobiles and yachts.  My luxury is to invest my surplus effort, 
beyond that required for the proper support of my family, to the 
pleasure of taking up a problem and solving, or helping to solve, it 
for the people without receiving any compensation.64 
Later in his life, Brandeis actively called on other lawyers to join him in 
public service.65  In a speech in 1916, The Opportunity in the Law, Brandeis 
argued (in language that sounds far too relevant to modern ears): 
[A]t the present time the lawyer does not hold as high a position 
with the people as he held seventy-five or indeed fifty years ago; 
but the reason is not lack of opportunity.  It is this: Instead of 
holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the 
people, prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers have, 
to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great 
corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their powers 
for the protection of the people.  We hear much of the “corporation 
lawyer,” and far too little of the “people’s lawyer.”  The great 
opportunity of the American Bar is and will be to stand again as it 
did in the past, ready to protect also the interests of the people.66 
Such a call, of course, is not inconsistent with Brandeis’s earlier 
arguments for the advocacy system.  Indeed, such volunteer representation is 
necessary if the advocacy system is to succeed.  If all of the parties who are 
affected by a legal dispute are not effectively represented, the advocacy 
system is unlikely to yield truth and justice. 
 63.  See SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 242 (citing Michael Schudson, Public, Private and 
Professional Lives:  The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 191, 210-11 (1977)). 
 64.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 154. 
 65.  Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical Society 
(May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313, 321 (1941). 
 66.  Id. 
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B.  Counseling Powerful Clients to Act Justly: “A Judicial Attitude Toward 
His Clients” 
The previous section argued that for the lawyer advocacy system to 
work effectively, all affected parties must be represented.67  Of course, it is 
unlikely that a sufficient number of volunteer lawyers are going to emerge to 
protect the interests of all of the unrepresented parties in legal actions in the 
United States.  One adjustment to the advocacy system that might temper 
this problem is if the more powerful parties in legal matters take the interests 
of other parties into consideration as they make decisions about the 
representation. 
 As noted above, in the MIT lectures Brandeis criticized lawyers who do 
not pursue a legal claim based on its questionable morality; he said that to do 
so sets up the lawyer as “superior to the law,” which is acceptable only “in 
flagrant cases.”68  Elsewhere in the lectures, however, Brandeis speaks 
highly of lawyers’ refusal to take at least one type of case on moral 
grounds.69  He notes that under the law in the United States at that time, a 
plaintiff could initiate a suit against a person, even where there was little or 
no evidence to support the case:  “If one person has a claim against another, 
be it well or ill founded, he can bring his action, that is, can put the 
defendant to the trial of the case.  The defendant has no protection except in 
the professional honor of the counsel whom the plaintiff may employ . . . .”70  
Though Brandeis does not elaborate, he seems to applaud the attorney who 
on moral grounds refuses to initiate a case that has little merit. 
It appears that Brandeis came to believe in his later years of law practice 
that lawyers should take even greater responsibility for their actions as 
lawyers.71  Brandeis refused to advocate causes that he considered to be 
unjust and counseled his clients to act in a just manner.72  Brandeis’s practice 
in this respect came to light during his Senate confirmation hearings.  “A 
banker testified that Brandeis, as a lawyer, had required satisfaction of the 
justness of the banker’s cause before deciding to take it on.  No other lawyer 
he had ever dealt with, the banker testified, raised that question.”73  Austen 
Fox, a former ABA president, testified that: “‘The trouble with Mr. Brandeis 
is that he never loses his judicial attitude toward his clients.  He always acts 
the part of a judge toward his clients instead of being his clients’ lawyer, 
 67.  See supra Part III.A. 
 68.  MIT LECTURES, supra note 30, at 247. 
 69.  Id. at 212. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See MASON, supra note 10, at 642. 
 72.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 72. 
 73.  SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 242 (quoting Schudson, supra note 63, at 210).  For further 
discussion of Brandeis and his law practice, see SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 241-308. 
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which is against the practices of the bar.’”74  With enemies like that who 
needs friends?  Maybe it is not surprising that Brandeis was ultimately 
confirmed.75 
It may be that if lawyers took a more active role in raising the question 
of justice with their clients, there would be less injustice and thus less need 
for other lawyers to take pro bono cases. 
C.  Seeking a Fair Solution for All: “Counsel for the Situation” 
If all cases had to be litigated, the legal advocacy system would quickly 
break down; lawyers spend much of their time seeking to resolve disputes 
outside of the court system.76  In his MIT lectures on lawyers, Brandeis 
makes no mention of the role that lawyers play in the negotiation of cases 
and business matters.77  Lawyers, of course, play an advocacy role in 
negotiation, as well as in litigation, speaking on behalf of clients.  They also, 
in consultation with their clients, seek to identify solutions to the problems 
that they face.  In his practice, Brandeis applied the great lawyer virtue of 
practical wisdom to such problems.78  He combined consideration for all of 
the people who might be affected in a case with his famous attention to 
detail and creativity.79  These factors, in many cases, enabled him to come 
up with a solution that worked to the benefit of all concerned.80 
In one case, for example, shoe manufacturer W.H. McElwain hired 
Brandeis to negotiate a cut in the hours of his employees.81  Instead, 
Brandeis figured out a means of restructuring the client’s business so as to 
benefit McElwain and to give employees the opportunity to work more 
hours.82 
In negotiations, Brandeis sought to resolve cases in a manner that 
benefitted all of the affected parties, rather than focusing solely on the 
interests of his client.83  In one such case, this led to an accusation of conflict 
 74.  See SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 242. 
 75.  See id. at 253. 
 76.  “[A]pproximately two-thirds to 70 percent of civil cases settle.”  STEPHEN SUBRIN & 
MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATION IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 220 (2008). 
 77.  See generally MIT LECTURES, supra note 30. 
 78.  See MASON, supra note 10, at 641. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at x. 
 81.  Id. at 63–65; see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
TRADITION 8 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1981). 
 82.  See BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 6, at 63–65. 
 83.  See, e.g., id. at 245. 
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of interest.84  Brandeis represented one of the creditors in the Lennox 
bankruptcy and was approached by a representative of Lennox, the bankrupt 
company.85  Brandeis stated that he would act as trustee for Lennox’s 
property and seek “to give everybody, to the very best of my ability, a 
square deal.”86  Lennox grew dissatisfied with the arrangement and initiated 
criminal fraud charges against Brandeis, which were later dropped.87  When 
pressed by Lennox’s lawyer, Sherman Whipple, to identify whom he 
represented when he gave a particular piece of advice in the case, Brandeis 
replied, “I should say I was counsel for the situation.”88  At Brandeis’s 
confirmation hearings, Whipple described his reaction: 
I think Mr. Brandeis was so much absorbed in the question of caring 
for the situation, and so much interested in the development of his 
ideas as to how this estate should be administered, that he 
unconsciously overlooked the more human aspect of it . . . .  He 
took a broader view . . . that he was charged with the duty and 
responsibility, not merely of looking to Mr. Lennox or to Mr. 
Lennox alone, but that he owed a larger and broader duty to all the 
interests involved.89 
Legal commentators’ reactions to the “counsel for the situation” have 
been mixed.  John Frank has said that “counsel for the situation” was “one of 
the most unfortunate phrases [Brandeis] ever casually uttered.”90  He argues 
that, while Brandeis did not breach any professional ethical norms, his 
failure to communicate well with Lennox had opened him to “justifiable 
criticism.”91  Geoffrey Hazard argues, however, that “[w]hen a relationship 
between the clients is amenable to ‘situation’ treatment, giving it that 
treatment is perhaps the best service a lawyer can render to anyone[,]” so 
long as the client and his adversary are fully informed of the arrangement 
and are willing to trust the good judgment and skill of the attorney.92 
 84.  See MASON, supra note 10, at 232–37. 
 85.  See id. at 232–33. 
 86.  Id. at 233. 
 87.  Id. at 235. 
 88.  THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL 
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, 1916–1975, at 287 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 2d. ed. 1977) 
(Testimony of Sherman Whipple). 
 89.  Id. at 299. 
 90.  John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 65 (1978); see also John S. 
Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern 
Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 751–57 (1992); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the 
Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377 (2004); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lawyer Who Overidentifies with 
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In my view, there is a place for “situation treatment” in almost any 
representation.  I recall from my days as a young law firm associate, 
working on a case until late at night, literally on the eve of trial.  We were to 
be in court for trial early the next morning.  In this case, a father and son had 
claims and counter-claims against one another over the ownership of the 
family business.  Often such disputes arise because things have gone poorly.  
In this case, the father and son were fighting because things had gone well: 
there was a successful business to fight over.  The father and son had not 
spoken to one another in years.  Pre-trial hearings had been rancorous, with 
father, son, and their lawyers making sharp attacks on one another. 
Shortly after midnight, our firm’s senior lawyer, Mr. Boyle, announced 
that he was going over to the office of Mr. Musselman, the senior lawyer on 
the other side.  I asked if this was a planned meeting.  “No,” Mr. Boyle said, 
“but Mr. Musselman will know that I am coming.”  They had been through 
this before.  Given what I had seen at the pre-trial hearings, I thought there 
was no hope of settlement. 
Mr. Boyle returned a few hours later, announced that the case had been 
settled, and told everyone to go home.  I asked Mr. Boyle how the 
conversation went.  He said that he started off by asking Mr. Musselman 
what would be fair.  Their conversation was all about fairness.  One proposal 
was made; it was unfair for this reason.  Another was made; it was unfair for 
that reason.  Eventually, the two lawyers came up with a resolution that they 
believed would be fair for both of their clients.  They were sure that their 
clients would agree.  And they did.   
I was a bit disappointed.  We had done all of our preparation and were 
ready for trial.  Our side had been successful as to pretrial issues, and I 
thought we would be successful at trial.  In the end, I am sure that the 
settlement was for the good of both father and son.  What surprised me at the 
time, as a recent law graduate, was that much of the negotiation was about 
“fairness.”  I knew, of course, that both lawyers had in the back of their 
minds where they stood regarding the law and the facts.  The negotiation 
took place, “in the shadow of the law.”93  There was also a lot of practicality 
in the lawyers’ discussion of fairness.  They wanted something that would 
work, in light of what they had learned about their clients.  What I witnessed 
was a Brandeis moment, though I would not have known to call it that at the 
His Client, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 827, 828–33 (2001); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: 
Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1499–1511 (1996). 
 93.  See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).   
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time (in law school, we studied Brandeis the Justice, not Brandeis the 
lawyer).  The lawyers—both strong advocates—were able to reach 
settlement because each looked out for the whole situation.  The result was 
good for both parties.  Lawyers reach settlements this way all of the time. 
Lawyers serve their clients well if they have a bit of Brandeis’s “counsel 
for the situation” in all cases.  A lawyer’s hope should be that his or her 
advocacy will lead to a just result.  Fairness should be a subject for 
discussion between the lawyer and the client and between the lawyers.  
Lawyers who are negotiating a case should approach one another with the 
hope, a wary hope, that they can reach a resolution that will be fair, even 
beneficial, to all. 
While looking out for their client’s interests, lawyers should look for a 
resolution that will benefit all.  Such an approach is most likely to result in a 
successful settlement of the matter—one that in the short run can be 
implemented smoothly, and in the long run will operate without leading to 
further conflict.  Of course, such a method will not always work.  It takes 
some level of cooperation from both sides.  If it becomes clear to a lawyer 
that the other lawyer is unwilling to try to be fair to all, the lawyer may need 
to fall back on aggressive negotiation and advocacy.  The legal system, with 
all of its expense, delays, and inefficiencies, can be left to take its course.  
But that should be seen as a failure, not the norm. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of the advocacy system is justice.  Lawyers play a part in 
that.  When both sides are well-represented, lawyers can play the adversarial 
role—within the constraints of the law—trusting that the system will 
generally yield a just result.  But, lawyers cannot merely put the blinders on 
and charge ahead, assuming that unrestrained advocacy will yield justice.  
Brandeis’s practice suggests that lawyers should go further.  Lawyers should 
volunteer to serve clients who would not be represented without their 
service.  They should address the question of fairness with clients, especially 
with powerful clients.  And, they should seek solutions of conflict that will 
benefit all of the parties who will be affected by the representation. 
 
